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PS2-015        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4613 
___________ 
 
TIMOTHY T. FLETCHER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PERRY PHELPS, individual and official capacities; MARK RISPOLLI, individual and 
official capacities; GLADYS LITTLE, Sgt. individual and official capacities; BRIAN 
REYNOLDS, individual and official capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D. Del. Civil Action No. 12-cv-00489) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  December 21, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Timothy Fletcher, a Delaware state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of 
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granting Sergeant Gladys 
Little’s motion for summary judgment on his failure-to-protect claim and dismissing his 
equal protection claim.  We will affirm, but on different grounds than the District Court.  
See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Distr., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting court 
may affirm on any basis supported by the record). 
 The record reflects that in late December 2011 Fletcher complained that his 
cellmate was harassing him because he is a homosexual.  As a result, Fletcher was moved 
to a different cell.  Fletcher then told Sergeant Little that he feared for his life because his 
new cellmate was harassing him on the same basis.  Little told Fletcher that he must ask a 
lieutenant to be moved.  She also told him that he should not taunt other inmates and that 
he should avoid places in the recreation yard where staff could not see him.  Little also 
spoke to Fletcher’s cellmate and her supervisor.  Fletcher reported to other correctional 
officers that his cellmate was threatening him and requested protective custody, a more 
restrictive type of confinement designed to keep inmates safe.  On or about January 2, 
2012, Fletcher was moved to protective custody.   
 On the night of January 7, 2012, Fletcher told Little that his new cellmate, Kevin 
Wilkerson, was making fun of him due to his sexual orientation, that he did not like 
Wilkerson, and that he wanted to be moved.  Sergeant John Goldman and Officer David 
Alston then told Little that Fletcher and Wilkerson were “bickering.”  Sometime between 
10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Little interviewed both men separately outside of their cell.  
Fletcher states that Little was told that Wilkerson was touching him and harassing him for 
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sex.  According to Little, Fletcher said that he was afraid of Wilkerson and that he feared 
that Wilkerson would try to rape him.  Wilkerson said that he was afraid of Fletcher 
because Fletcher was harassing him for sex.  Little told them each to stop bickering or 
they would have to go to isolation.  Both men agreed to stop arguing.1 
 According to an incident report prepared by Little, at 1:30 a.m., when she and 
Officer Keith Burns were checking the area, Fletcher told her that Wilkerson was 
harassing him for sex.  Wilkerson stated that Fletcher was harassing him.  Little told both 
men that if their conduct continued, she would move them to isolation.  They told Little 
that they would stop.  Thereafter, both inmates went to sleep.   
 At 3:21 a.m., during medication rounds, Officer Jeffery Holcomb saw that 
Wilkerson had cuts and scratch marks on his face.  Wilkerson told Holcomb that he had 
fallen when jumping off his bunk bed.  Fletcher had no visible injuries.  A disciplinary 
hearing was held, and Fletcher was found guilty of assault, disorderly or threatening 
behavior, and fighting, and sanctioned to 30 days in isolation.  The disciplinary hearing 
decision reflects that Fletcher said that he and Wilkerson were fighting, but that he did 
not hit Wilkerson in the face.  Fletcher, however, attests that Wilkerson tried to rape him 
and that he defended himself.  Fletcher asserted in grievances that staff failed to do 
anything when he reported Wilkerson’s advances.   
                                              
1Contrary to Little’s affidavit, Goldman and Alston, who were present when the inmates 
were questioned, attest that Fletcher said that he wanted to be moved to a single cell 
because he did not like Wilkerson.  We have viewed the facts in a light most favorable to 
Fletcher.  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 
4 
 
 Fletcher filed a complaint in District Court, which he later amended, claiming that 
Little failed to protect him in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and discriminated 
against him based on his sexual orientation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2  
Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Little on 
Fletcher’s Eighth Amendment claim and dismissed his equal protection claim as 
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  This appeal followed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over orders granting summary judgment.  Blunt, 767 F.3d at 265.  We review the 
dismissal of Fletcher’s equal protection claim under § 1915(e) for abuse of discretion, 
although we exercise plenary review over issues of law.  Deutsch v. United States, 67 
F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on a failure to prevent harm, 
an inmate must show (1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial 
risk of serious harm; and (2) that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to his 
safety.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  “Deliberate indifference” is a 
subjective standard.  See id. at 837.  A prison official must know of and disregard an 
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.  Id.  
 The District Court decided that a reasonable jury could conclude that Little was 
subjectively aware of a substantial risk of harm to Fletcher based on her knowledge  
                                              
2Fletcher had brought claims against other defendants, which he did not pursue or the 
District Court dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  These claims are not at issue. 
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that he feared that he would be assaulted, her advice to him regarding his fears, and the 
fact that she had asked her supervisor about changing his cell before he was moved to 
protective custody.  The District Court, however, held that no reasonable jury could find 
that Little violated Fletcher’s Eighth Amendment rights because Little took reasonable 
steps to prevent harm from occurring.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (stating that a prison 
official who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate safety may be found free from 
liability if he responded reasonably to the risk). 
 Fletcher argues on appeal that a jury should have decided his claim.  We conclude 
that summary judgment was not warranted on the question whether Little reasonably 
responded to a risk of harm.  There are discrepancies among the affidavits and incident 
reports – particularly those prepared by Little – as to the conversations that transpired 
between Fletcher and Little on January 7 and January 8, 2012.  The record also reflects 
that Fletcher told Little that Wilkerson was harassing him for sex not only when she 
questioned him outside his cell, but also later on her rounds.  Little responded both times 
by threatening time in isolation.  If we were to agree with the District Court that Little 
was aware of a substantial risk of harm to Fletcher, the reasonableness of Little’s 
response would be a factual question for a jury.  See Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 
748-49 (3d Cir. 1997) (reasonableness of response by defendants who were aware of 
inmate’s risk of harm was question for the jury). 
 We cannot conclude, however, that there is an issue of fact as to whether Little 
was aware of a substantial risk of harm to Fletcher.  The Supreme Court did not address 
in Farmer “[a]t what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for 
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Eighth Amendment purposes,” 511 U.S. at 834 n.3, but the evidence in this case falls far 
short of establishing that Little was aware of a substantial risk of harm.  This is not a case 
where a prisoner who was vulnerable to attack remained in the general population.  See 
Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 747-48 (summary judgment improper on question of official’s 
knowledge of risk where inmate had a history of being assaulted, had been labeled a 
“snitch,” and was placed in the general population despite a recommendation to the 
contrary).  Rather, Fletcher requested and was placed in protective custody when he 
reported that a cellmate had threatened him.   
 Although an official may be deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm in protective 
custody, Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 368 (3d Cir. 2012), there is scant evidence 
reflecting that was the case here.  The only evidence supporting a conclusion that 
Fletcher was at risk of harm consists of his own statements prior to the altercation that 
Wilkerson touched him and harassed him for sex.  Even if it can be inferred that Fletcher 
was at greater risk of harm than other inmates due to his sexual orientation, the evidence 
is insufficient to show that Little was aware of a substantial risk of harm.  See Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 140 (3d Cir. 2001) (summary judgment warranted 
where defendant knew of allegations of harm but there was no evidence that the 
defendant believed the allegations or that the evidence surrounding the allegations was so 
strong that he must have believed them likely to be true); see also Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 
669-70 (noting that prisoners may feign a fear of harm and distinguishing pleadings 
alleging unadorned claims of danger from allegations that officials put an inmate in 
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danger by seeking his help in an investigation and then failing to protect him from 
retaliation).    
 We note that during discovery Fletcher sought but was denied access to 
Wilkerson’s prison disciplinary history related to sexual misconduct.  However, even if 
Wilkerson had such a history, there is no indication that such evidence would have 
supported his claim of deliberate indifference against Little.  Little stated in her discovery 
responses that she was not aware of any such disciplinary records.  Little also attested 
that before this incident she had no personal knowledge that Wilkerson engaged in fights 
with other inmates or that he harassed or threatened Fletcher or any other inmate.  Little 
stated that she believed that Wilkerson was a peaceful inmate, a view that was also held 
by Officer Alston.    
 Fletcher also appeals the dismissal of his equal protection claim, but we agree, for 
substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, that dismissal was warranted.  To 
the extent Fletcher appeals the District Court’s denial of his requests for appointment of 
counsel and certain discovery motions, he has not shown that the District Court abused its 
discretion.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
